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Summary:   This paper considers judgments based on agreement of the parties in Croatian law, 
more precisely particular aspects of this consensual form which previous studies 
have assessed to be potentially problematic. These aspects include the objectives 
of reaching agreement, the gravity of criminal offences subject to agreement, 
the role of the court, and the legal position of the defence and that of the victim. 
These aspects are analysed primarily from a comparative-law perspective, since 
the Croatian version of plea bargaining, just like specific models adopted in some 
other European countries, was inspired by the same American model. Besides 
American law, the research includes Italian, French, Swiss, German and Austrian 
law. The goal of the comparative research is to find out whether the Croatian model 
contains some specific features which perhaps differ from positive comparative 
European legal solutions, but also result in theoretical and practical problems. 
The study will also include analysis of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of 
the Republic of Croatia concerning primarily the issue of judicial control over the 
agreement of the parties, which has been most disputed in domestic literature and 
in judicial practice.
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1.  INTrodUCTIoN
Judgment based on agreement of the parties is a Croatian model of plea bargaining, a 
consensual procedure which exists in various forms in a number of comparative legal systems. 
Although a relatively new procedural form, it was quickly accepted in Croatian judicial prac-
tice primarily due to the fact that it enables the economical and speedy solving of criminal 
cases.1 This paper does not offer a comprehensive analysis of judgments based on agreement 
of the parties in Croatian law, which has relatively often been discussed in the domestic liter-
ature. Instead, this paper is devoted to particular aspects of this consensual form which have 
been detected in previous studies as potentially problematic and which include the objectives 
of reaching agreement, the gravity of criminal offences subject to agreement, the role of the 
court, as well as the legal position of the defence and also that of the victim.2 These aspects will 
be analysed primarily from a comparative-law perspective, since the Croatian version of plea 
bargaining, just like specific models adopted in some other European countries, was inspired 
by the same American model.3
Versions of plea agreements in continental European countries differ in many respects 
from the American model, and also differ from each other, primarily due to the countries’ 
different legal traditions and various basic principles of domestic criminal procedures. The re-
search will therefore include, besides American law, Italian, French, Swiss, German and Austri-
an law. These European legal systems are close to the Croatian system due to historical bonds, 
geographical proximity or/and traditional influence. The goal of the comparative research is 
to find out whether the Croatian model contains some specific features which perhaps differ 
from positive comparative European legal solutions, but which also result in theoretical and 
practical problems. The research will also include analysis of the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Croatia primarily concerning the issue of judicial control over the 
agreement of the parties, which has, at least up to this moment, been most disputed in domes-
tic literature and in judicial practice.
2.  CoMPArATIvE LEGAL ANALYSIS
2.1.   AMErICAN ModEL of PLEA bArGAINING – AN INSPIrATIoN for 
EUroPEAN LEGAL LEGISLATorS
Settlements in criminal proceedings are one of the most significant features of the US judi-
cial system. Although plea agreement has been applied in the United States for more than two 
1  See Turudić, I., Pavelin Borzić, T., Bujas, I., Sporazum stranaka u kaznenom postupku – trgovina pravdom ili? Pravni vjesnik, Vol. 32, 
No. 1, 2016, p. 122. See also Tomičić, Z., Novokmet, A., Nagodbe stranaka u kaznenom postupku – dostignuća i perspektive, Pravni 
vjesnik, Vol. 28, No. 3-4, 2012, pp. 177 – 178.
2  See Ivičević Karas, E., Consensual  Justice  in  Croatian  Criminal  Procedural Law: the Need for a Systematic Approach, in “EU 2020 – 
Lessons from the Past and Solutions for the Future, EU and Comparative Law Issues and Challenges Series (ECLIC) – ISSUE 4, 
University of Josip Juraj Strossmayer Faculty of Law, Osijek, 2020,  p. 429.
3  Krstulović Relija, A., Primjena kazne na zahtjev stranaka kao mehanizam konsenzualnog stranačkog upravljanja postupkom u 
talijanskom kaznenom procesnom pravu, Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002, pp. 374 – 380.
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hundred years,4 putting this into everyday practice began only in 1970 after the US Supreme 
Court, in the famous case of Brady v. United States,5 gave legitimacy to consensual procedures 
for agreements, emphasising on that occasion that this was an integral part of the US criminal 
justice system, significantly contributing to the efficiency of criminal justice.6 Today, plea bar-
gaining has virtually become almost the only way of dealing with criminal cases. According to 
statistical indicators, in 2019, as many as 97% of cases ended in a settlement.7
Although the term settlement is usually denoted in everyday speech by the phrase plea bar-
gaining, it should be emphasised that there are several forms of plea agreements. In particu-
lar, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter: FRCP)8 distinguish between charge 
bargaining and sentence bargaining (Art. 11 (c) (1) FRCP) as two basic forms of settlement, 
while in practice count bargaining and fact bargaining are also mentioned as types of plea 
agreement.9 Charge bargaining is the most common and widespread form of plea bargaining. 
It is an agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant in which the prosecutor agrees 
to mitigate the indictment in exchange for the defendant’s confession by giving up the origi-
nal charge for a lesser charge (for example, the prosecutor may propose dropping the murder 
count for the defendant and have him plead guilty to manslaughter).10 Count bargaining is a 
subtype of charge bargaining that comes to the fore when a person is charged with multiple 
crimes.11 In such a situation, the prosecutor and the defendant may enter into an agreement 
that the defendant will plead guilty to certain charges in exchange for other charges being 
dropped. Fact bargaining is also a subtype of charge bargaining by which the prosecutor and 
the defendant agree on certain facts of the offence for which the defendant will plead guilty 
but which do not correspond to the offence actually committed. In other words, the defend-
ant will plead guilty in order to keep certain facts out of the case that would lead to a harsher 
punishment.12 Finally, sentence bargaining is an agreement by which the prosecutor and the 
defendant agree on a particular punishment to be imposed on the defendant on condition 
that he pleads guilty (Art. 11 (c), 1, B, C, FRCP). However, it should be emphasised that the 
prosecutor does not impose a punishment, but the parties bring their agreement before the 
court, according to which the judge can refuse this kind of agreement if he or she disagrees 
with the punishment that has been offered by the prosecutor. Simply because of this risk, sen-
tence bargaining is rarely used in practice, since charge bargaining is a safer and easier way for 
an agreement that will satisfy both the prosecutor and the defendant.13
4  See: Fischer, G., Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 109, 2000, pp. 857-1086, Alschuler, A. W., Plea Bargaining 
and Its History, Law & Society Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1979, pp. 211-245.
5  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970).
6  Kavanaugh, J., Plea Bargaining: The Prosecutor’s Perspective, Police Law Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4, 1977, pp. 6-7.
7  2019 Annual report and sourcebook of federal sentencing statistics https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf, p. 56. Accessed 1 November 
2020.
8  https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp. Accessed 1 November 2020. 
9  See: Parker, J. F., Plea Bargaining, American Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1972, p. 188.
10  Ibid.
11  Ibid., p. 191.
12  Ibid.
13  Ibid., p. 189.
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The mentioned various forms of settlements were able to develop and can exist success-
fully today in the US due to the very specific features of that legal system. One feature is 
the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings where the position of the judge is extremely 
passive, and the key initiative in gathering evidence is placed on both the prosecutor and the 
defendant, which is why it is a purely party-driven procedure.14 Investigation conducted by the 
police and the prosecutor is one-sided and exclusively focused on gathering procedural ma-
terial to establish the defendant’s guilt, while the defendant and his counsel undertake their 
investigation to gather evidence in favour of the defence.15 These are essentially two parallel 
investigations, each focused on its own goal. One aims at establishing the guilt of the defend-
ant, and the other at establishing the defendant’s innocence.16 In such a situation, neither 
party is aware of the opposing party’s evidence until the preliminary hearing aimed at disclos-
ing evidence between the parties, in order to allow the court and the parties to question the 
legality of the evidence gathered during the investigation. In such a constellation of relations 
between the parties, the prosecutor and the defendant, using their procedural rights, directly 
influence the course and outcome of the criminal proceedings.17 Another feature is directly 
related to the position and powers of the prosecutor in criminal proceedings. The prosecutor’s 
conduct is characterised by wide discretionary powers.18 Discretion is manifested to the extent 
that the prosecutor decides entirely independently on whether to prosecute a person before 
the court, for which criminal offence, and under which law, or simply to drop the charges.19 In 
doing so, the prosecutor’s decision is not subject to judicial review, and, as each prosecutor’s 
office is decentralised and there is no strict hierarchy, then the prosecutor’s decisions are not 
subject to review by higher prosecutors and he or she is not required to follow any instructions 
in the respective work.20 It follows that the prosecutor is the master of the pre-trial criminal 
proceedings, which implies broad authority to autonomously decide when and for which crim-
inal offence to offer the defendant settlement depending on the quality of evidence available 
at a given moment.21 Such broad discretionary authority gives the prosecutor legal power and 
the flexibility to negotiate, even in cases where he or she does not have solid evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt.
As much as settlements appear to be an effective and simple system of conducting criminal 
justice, today they have been severely criticised in scientific and professional circles.22 One 
of the main problems is that settlement sacrifices justice, as a result of which a significant 
14  Viano, E. C., Plea Bargaining in the United States: A Perversion of Justice, Revue internationale de droit pénal, Vol. 83, No. 1-2, 
2012, p. 111.
15  Damaška, M., O nekim učincima stranački oblikovanog pripremnog kaznenog postupka, Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, 
Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 3-13.
16  Tomičić, Novokmet, op. cit. note 1, p. 153.
17  Viano, op. cit. note 14.
18  See: Albonetti, C. A., Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, Law & Society Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1987, pp. 291-314., 
Alschluer, A. W., The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1968, pp. 50-112.
19  Lafave, W. R., The Prosecutor’s Discretion in The United States, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1970, pp. 
538-539.
20  Pizzi, W. T., Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an 
Instrument of Reform, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 54, No. 5, p. 1049-1050.
21  Bibas, S., Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 117, No. 8, 2004, pp. 2470-2476.
22  See: Johnson, T., Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, American Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 133-156.
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proportion of criminals are not punished harshly enough.23 Furthermore, many defendants 
prefer to accept the prosecutor’s generous offer and enter into a settlement to avoid the risk of 
a harsh punishment before the jury. However, a peculiar problem is the frequent criticism that 
plea agreement is the result of coercion conducted under the direction of the prosecutor.24 Pri-
marily driven by interest in obtaining as many convictions as possible, prosecutors abuse their 
powerful discretion to obtain the defendant’s confession at all costs, even in cases where they 
do not have solid evidence that the person has committed a crime. In such situations, prose-
cutors often add multiple charges or they charge the defendant with a more serious offence 
to induce the defendant to plead guilty during the negotiations and agree to a conviction for 
a lighter criminal offence. Finally, most defendants do not have the funds to pay for a lawyer. 
Therefore, they have the fate of receiving legal aid from a public defender who does not have 
enough financial and time resources to provide quality legal aid, so they regularly advise the 
defendant to plead guilty with minimum investigation.25
2.2.  dIffErENT ModELS of PLEA bArGAINING IN EUroPEAN CoNTINENTAL 
LEGAL SYSTEMS
2.2.1.  Italian model of patteggiamento
Application della pena su richiesta delle parti - patteggiamento (Art. 444 - 448 CPP26) is a mod-
el of plea agreement developed in Italian law as an alternative, more economical procedure to 
the main hearing.27 This consensual form implies that the defendant agrees not to challenge 
the accusation, and in return the punishment is reduced by up to a third. 
The traditional form of this agreement (patteggiamento tradizionale) may be required for 
criminal offences punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years (also when 
a fine is included), while the extended plea agreement (patteggiamento allargato) allows the 
parties to agree on a sanction which, reduced by up to one third, does not exceed five years of 
custodial sentence alone or together with a fine.28 Thereby, the law (in Art. 444(1-bis) explicitly 
excludes from bargaining specific types of criminal offences, such as organised crime, terror-
ism, child prostitution, child pornography, group sexual violence, human trafficking, kidnap-
ping for the purpose of extortion, etc., as well as defendants who have been declared habitual, 
professional, or repeat offenders, or those with a tendency to commit offences. In relation to 
individual criminal offences, the possibility of agreement is conditioned by the return of the 
entire acquired profit or material gain from the criminal offence (Art. 444(1-ter) CPP).
23  Berdejó, C., Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea Bargaining, Boston College Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2018, pp. 1187-
1249.
24  McCoy, C., Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, Criminal Law Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 1 & 2, 
2005, pp. 67-107.
25  Walker Wilson, M. J., Defense Attorney Bias and the Rush to the Plea, Kansas Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 271-325.
26  Codice di procedura penale, Aggiornato al D.L. 17 marzo 2020, n. 18, https://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-
altalex/2014/10/30/codice-di-procedura-penale. Accessed 5 December 2020.
27  Weichbrodt, K., Das Konsensprinzip strafprozessualer Absprachen, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2006, p. 252.
28  Patteggiamento, https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/patteggiamento/. Accessed 5 December 2020.
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The request may be presented by either of the parties to the judge, at the preliminary hear-
ing, or until the opening of the trial in cases of specific procedures (Art. 446 (1) CPP). The role 
of a judge is to verify whether the specific criminal offence can be the subject of agreement, 
the correctness of the legal qualification of the offence, as well as the adequacy of the pro-
posed punishment, i.e. whether the proposed punishment may fulfil the purpose of sanction-
ing (Art. 444(2) CPP). This means that the parties may not negotiate on the legal qualification 
of the offence. In addition, the court controls not only whether the formal preconditions are 
met, but also the material preconditions, so that it can acquit the defendant, and also reject 
the request if it considers the requested sentence inappropriate, given all the circumstances 
of the case and the purpose of punishment.29 Although the stated power of the court is not 
explicitly prescribed in the provisions regulating patteggiamento, it derives from Art. 27 of the 
Italian Constitution, to which the Italian Constitutional Court also referred when it declared 
unconstitutional the provisions of Art. 444 para. 2 of the CPP because the judge could not as-
sess the conformity of the sentence imposed by the parties and reject their request in the case 
of its unfavourable assessment.30 The Constitutional Court emphasised that it is the duty of 
the court to assess the appropriateness of the sentence in each case given the special preven-
tive purpose that it must accomplish.31 If an agreement is permitted in this regard, the judge 
may not impose a type or measure of punishment other than that specified in the agreement. 
The judge may order the defendant to appear if he or she deems it appropriate to verify the 
voluntary nature of the request or consent (Art. 446(5) CPP).
The parties may challenge the agreement before the court of cassation, but only for reasons 
related to the will of the defendant, the lack of correlation between the request and the sen-
tence imposed, the incorrect legal qualification of the act, or an unlawful sentence or security 
measure (Art. 448(2-bis) CPP).
The procedure of patteggiamento, including passing a judgment, is not public. In addition, it 
is completely closed to victims, meaning that the victim does not have any possibility to influ-
ence the contents of the draft sentence, which may be prepared even without his or her knowl-
edge, nor does the victim have the possibility to argue his or her disagreement.32 Moreover, 
the victim does not have the opportunity to actively participate in the criminal proceedings 
in the capacity of the injured party (parte civile), since, in the patteggiamento procedure, the 
judge does not make a decision on a claim for indemnification.33 On one hand, if we look from 
the perspective of fundamental rights, such legislation is not in itself contrary to Convention 
law, as long as the victim can exercise his or her civil rights in litigation.34  Yet, such a margin-
alised role of the victim is criticised in literature from the aspect of European legal standards 
guaranteed by Directive 2012/29/UE, which should enable the victim to actively participate in 
criminal proceedings, advocate for his or her interests, and influence the outcome.35 
29  Krstulović, op. cit. note 3, pp. 378 and 388. See also Tomičić, Novokmet, op. cit. note 1, pp. 175 and 177.
30  Corte Costituzionale, sentenza 2 luglio 1990, n. 313 (Gazzetta ufficiale, 1 serie speciale, 4 luglio 1990, n. 27). 
31  Ibid.
32  Sanna, A., Il “patteggiamento” tra prassi e novelle legislative, Wolters Kluwer CEDAM, 2018, p. 45.
33  Ibid., pp. 45 – 46.
34  See ECtHR, Mihova v. Italy, Décision sur la recevabilité, 25000/07, 30 March 2010. See Simonato, M., Deposizione della vittima e 
giustizia penale, Wolters Kluwer CEDAM, 2014, pp. 52 – 53.
35  Ibid., pp. 48 – 49.
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In conclusion, in Italian law, plea bargaining is allowed only for less serious criminal offenc-
es. The parties may not negotiate on the legal qualification of the offence. The court controls 
not only the formal preconditions, but also the material preconditions, in the sense that it can 
acquit the defendant, or reject the request if it considers the requested sentence inappropri-
ate. The procedure before the court is not open to the public, or to the victim.
2.2.2.  French model of plaider coupable 
The French model of plea bargaining - comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité 
(plaider coupable) was introduced with the legislative reform of 2004 and was directly inspired 
by the American original.36  It is regulated in Art. 495-7 – 495-16 CPP.37
This form of consensual procedure may be applied to all offences from the category of 
délits, which includes offences punishable with imprisonment of up to ten years,38 with the 
exception of minors (persons under the age of eighteen) and matters of press offences, man-
slaughter and political offences (Art. 495-16 CPP), as well as offences of wilful and uninten-
tional attacks on the integrity of persons and sexual assault when perpetrators are punished 
with a term of imprisonment of more than five years (Art. 495-7 CPA). The prosecutor may 
propose one or more of the main or additional penalties, and when a prison sentence is pro-
posed, it cannot exceed one year, or half of the prison sentence incurred (Art. 495-8 CPA). The 
legal qualificaiton is not an object of the agreement.
The presence of the defence counsel is mandatory during the admission of the facts, and 
the defendant has the right to consult freely with the defence counsel before making his or 
her decision (Art. 495-8 CPA). The role of the lawyer is not only to counsel the defendant, but 
also to advise him or her.39
Once the proposed sentence is accepted in the mandatory presence of the defence counsel, 
the public prosecutor files a request for homologation before the court. The judge must first 
hear the defendant and his or her lawyer, and then verify “the reality of the facts and their legal 
qualification” (Art. 495-9 CPP). Only after that may the judge, in a reasoned order, decide to ap-
prove the punishments proposed by the public prosecutor. The procedure is open to the public 
(Art. 495-9 CPP) and is therefore transparent. The order must be motivated by the findings 
that the person recognises the facts of which he or she is accused, and accepts the proposed 
sentence, but also that the sentence is “justified in view of the circumstances of the offence and the 
personality of its author” (Art. 495-11 CPP). This means that the judge has the opportunity to 
take into account a whole range of objective and subjective circumstances relevant for assess-
ing the appropriateness of the proposed sentence.
The judgment may be appealed by both parties for all the reasons prescribed in Art. 498, 
500, 502 and 505 CPP (Art. 495-11 CPP). On one hand, the relatively wide possibility of ap-
36  Papadopoulos, I., « Plaider coupable » La pratique américaine. Le texte français, PUF, 2004, p. 71.
37  Code de procedure penale, Version en vigueur au 08 décembre 2020, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/texte_lc/
LEGITEXT000006071154/. Accessed 6 December 2020.
38  Hamdan, S., Absprachen im französischen Strafverfahren? Nomos, 2018, p. 29.
39  Ibid., p. 91.
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peal can be called into question because this version of plea agreement implies a decision 
based on the agreement of the parties, and, in this sense, it has a contractual character. How-
ever, on the other hand, it provides for an additional guarantee against any error of fact or of 
interpretation of the will of the person in the course of the homologation procedure before 
the court.40 In addition, the defendant may apply to the Court of Cassation in accordance with 
the general rules.41
The victim is also informed of the procedure, invited to appear before the court, may be-
come a civil party, and may seek compensation of damage. The victim may also appeal against 
the order if he or she was not present at the hearing when the order was issued (Art. 495-13 
CPP). Besides being able to use specific procedural rights, the victim has the right to partici-
pate in the public hearing which also contributes to the transparency of the whole procedure 
as a whole.
If the proposed sentence is not accepted by the party or by the judge, the report on the 
proceedings of plaider coupable may not be sent to the competent court, nor may the parties 
refer to it (485-14 CPP). In this way, the continued procedure will not be contaminated by the 
contents of the unsuccessful agreement, which could be harmful to the defence.
In conclusion, in French law, plea bargaining is allowed only for less serious to more serious 
offences. The parties may not negotiate on the legal qualification of the offence. The court con-
trols not only the legal qualification, but also whether the requested sentence is “justified in 
view of the circumstances of the offence and the personality of its author”. The hearing is open 
to the public and to the victim. Finally, there are rather large possibilities of appeal.
2.2.3.  Swiss model of abgekürztes verfahren 
The accelerated procedure (abgekürztes Verfahren) is the closest relative of plea bargaining 
in the Swiss criminal procedure. At the national level, it was introduced in legislation in 2011, 
when the first Swiss Criminal Procedure Code42 (CPC) came into force.43 The main purpose of 
this consensual form is to accelerate criminal proceedings and ultimately relieve the judici-
ary.44 The rules governing the accelerated procedure are laid down in Articles 358 – 362 CPC.
The initiative to conduct accelerated proceedings is always in the hands of the defendant 
(Art. 385-1 CPC), i.e. the public prosecutor may not initiate it ex officio. The defendant may 
request these proceedings provided he or she admits the facts which are essential to the legal 
assessment of the case (den Sachverhalt, der für die rechtliche Würdigung wesentlich ist) and rec-
ognises, at least in principle, the civil claims. From the start of this accelerated procedure, the 
40  Papadopulos, op. cit. note 36, p. 90.
41  Hamdan, op. cit. note 38, pp. 93 – 94.
42  Code de procédure pénale, du 5 octobre 2007 (Etat le 1er février 2020), https://www.droit-bilingue.ch/rs/lex/2005/23/20052319-
unique-en-fr.html. Accessed 7 December 2020.
43  The majority of jurisprudence was unfavourable to the introduction of plea bargaining, e.g. Donatsch, Vereinbarungen im 
Strafprozess, in: Festschrift zum 50jährigen Bestehen der Schweizerischen Kriminalistischen Gesellschaft, Bern, 1992, p. 159; 
Hauser, Schweri, Schweizerisches Strafprozessrecht, Basel/Frankfurt, 1999., § 49.
44  Code de procédure pénale suisse, Commentaire Romand (Jeanneret, Y.; Kuhn, A.; Perrier Depeursinge, C. eds.), Helbing 
Lichtenhahn, 2019, p. 2271.
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defendant must be assisted by a defence counsel.45 The most important legislative constraint 
in initiating the accelerated procedure is the provision which limits it to cases in which the 
public prosecutor requests a custodial sentence of not more than five years (Art. 358-2 CPC), 
which means that ordinary proceedings must be conducted if the prosecutor seeks a harsher 
sentence. But even if the prosecutor seeks a more lenient sentence, he or she is not obliged to 
accept the defendant’s request to conduct an accelerated procedure. His decision on wheth-
er to conduct an accelerated procedure is final and does not need to contain a statement of 
reasons (Art. 395-1 CPC). In any case, the defendant’s request and the prosecutor’s decision 
thereupon must be made prior to the bringing of charges.
If the public prosecutor decides to conduct accelerated proceedings, he or she serves the 
indictment on the parties, which contains, apart from its standard elements required by the 
Criminal Procedure Code, some special elements, most importantly the sentence (das Straf-
mass) (Art. 360-1 CPC). Within ten days, the parties must irrevocably declare whether or not 
they consent to the indictment, whereby “the party” is not only the accused, but also the pri-
vate claimant (Privatklägerschaft), i.e. a person suffering harm (die geschädigte Person) who ex-
pressly declares that he or she wishes to participate in the criminal proceedings. If the private 
claimant fails to reject the indictment in writing within the time limit, he or she is considered 
to have agreed to it (Art. 360-3 CPC). If the indictment is rejected by any of the parties, an 
ordinary preliminary procedure (ordentliches Vorverfahren) will be conducted.
When the parties (the accused and the private claimant) approve the indictment, the pub-
lic prosecutor submits the indictment with the case file to the court of first instance, which 
conducts a main hearing (Hauptverhandlung) (Art. 361-1 CPC). The main hearing is remark-
ably swifter than in ordinary proceedings as no procedure for taking evidence is to be con-
ducted. After questioning the defendant, the court establishes if the defendant admits the 
facts on which the charges are based and if this admission corresponds to the circumstances 
laid out in the case file. Such a summary hearing is, however, not just a formality: it is still a 
public hearing, which ensures that the agreement between the parties does not escape public 
scrutiny and responsibility.
Upon the closure of the main hearing, the court is not obliged to issue a judgement. It 
freely decides (befindet frei darüber) if the conduct of the accelerated procedure is lawful and 
appropriate (rechtmässig und angebracht), if the charge corresponds to the outcome of the main 
hearing and to the case file and if the requested sanctions are adequate (angemessen) (Art. 
362-1 CPC). If the requirements for a judgment in the accelerated procedure are not met, the 
court returns the case file to the public prosecutor in order to conduct ordinary preliminary 
proceedings. This decision may not be contested. Statements made by the parties with regard 
to the accelerated procedure may not be used in any subsequent ordinary procedure.
On the other hand, if the court – upon its free deliberation –  finds that the requirements 
for a judgment in the accelerated proceedings are met, it issues a judgment that sets out the 
offences, sanctions and civil claims contained in the indictment, which means that the court 
may not unilaterally modify the agreement between the parties once it decides to accept it 
(Art. 362-2 CPC). The court is not obliged to give an exhaustive statement of the grounds for 
45  Ibid., p. 2273.
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the judgment; it only summarily declares that the requirements for the accelerated proceed-
ings have been met. 
As regards the right to appeal against the judgment in the accelerated proceedings, this 
legal remedy may be filed only if the party does not accept the indictment, i.e. if the judgment 
was delivered in the absence of a formal agreement,46 or if the judgment does not correspond 
to the indictment (Art. 362-5 CPP).
Accelerated proceedings in Swiss legal systems can certainly be said to constitute a form 
of plea bargaining, but they are nevertheless marked by general principles of the Swiss crim-
inal procedure, especially by the inquisitorial principle (Amtsermittlungsgrundsatz),47 i.e. by 
the active role played by the judge who is not only authorised, but also obliged, to investigate 
ex officio (without a proposal of the person concerned) the facts on which a decision is to be 
based. Having this in mind, it should not be surprising that the court retains an important 
role in accelerated proceedings in deciding if the plea agreement is to be accepted or rejected. 
Another significant mechanism of control is the right of the victim not only to participate in 
the simplified procedure in the capacity of a complaining party,48 but also to discontinue the 
plea bargaining. The procedure is open to the public and is therefore transparent. Finally, an 
important mechanism of control is operated through the fact that plea bargaining is restricted 
to minor and moderate criminal offences.
2.2.4.  German plea agreement “Absprache”
Implementation of consensual justice in German criminal proceedings has been gradually 
evolving since the 1970s.49 Firstly, under pressure from a large number of cases, the German 
judiciary gradually relativised the principle of compulsory prosecution in favour of the prin-
ciple of opportunity by accepting the conditional waiver of criminal prosecution, and then, 
through the institution of a penal order, sought to expedite proceedings by skipping the hear-
ing as the central stage of the criminal proceedings.50 At the same time, kinds of negotiations 
and agreements outside the court (Absprache) began to take place.51 The essence of the nego-
tiations lay in the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty, and that the judge in turn promised 
a more lenient penalty than would have been given at the hearing. Informal settlements have 
gradually gained so much momentum that they have become regular in the practice of judicial 
bodies. Despite such developments, the legislator remained passive until 2009, when settle-
ments were finally enacted by the Act on the Regulation of Agreements in Criminal Proceed-
ings of 28 May 2009.52
46  Ibid., p. 2305.
47  Ibid., p. 2271.
48  Ibid., p. 2273.
49  Herrman, J., Bargaining Justice - A Bargain for German Criminal Justice? University of Pittsburgh Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1992, 
p. 755.
50  Weigend, T., Iontcheva Turner, J., The Constitutionality of Negotiated Criminal Judgments in Germany, German Law Journal, p. 
83-84.
51  Iontcheva Turner, J., Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 
54, No. 1, 2006, p. 217.
52  See Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung im Strafverfahren, July 29, 2009, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I, [BGBL. I].
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The implementation of consensual procedures is most often explained by the need to in-
crease the efficiency of proceedings and to reduce their costs53 thorough party-driven proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, even after enacting settlement, Germany remained consistent with the 
tradition of its criminal procedure based on the standpoint that its primary task is to find the 
substantive truth.54 This is clear from § 257c (1) of the StPO, which stipulates that the court 
may reach an agreement with the parties on the further course and outcome of the proceed-
ings, but the outcome of such an agreement must in no way jeopardise the court’s general 
obligation to establish the truth and the ex officio taking of evidence of all facts and means 
of proof which are relevant to the decision (§ 244 (2) StPO). Thus, the establishment of sub-
stantive truth has remained the fundamental premise of German criminal proceedings, from 
which it follows that any confession of the defendant based on agreement must be checked 
for accuracy by the taking of evidence during the main hearing. It follows from the above that 
a judgment under an agreement can be rendered by a court only when the offence has been 
fully investigated and there are grounds to believe that the admission of guilt is genuine.55 This 
was confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court, emphasising that settlement alone is not 
sufficient for the pronouncement of a judgment, but the court must base the judgment on a 
sufficiently founded conviction determined by facts and circumstances reached through the 
entire main trial.56 In addition to the principle of substantive truth, another important princi-
ple of German criminal justice is the so-called principle of guilt (Schuldprinzip). As in the reg-
ular procedure, so in the procedure of concluding a settlement, the court has the duty to find 
the facts necessary to establish the level of the defendant’s guilt.57 In other words, the court is 
obliged to determine the right measure of punishment taking into account the proportional 
correlation between the offender’s blameworthiness and the sanction imposed on him.58
The court has a central role in the plea agreement. Not only does the court, in suitable 
cases,59 initiate the plea agreement procedure but it proposes a lower minimum and an upper 
maximum sentence that can be imposed on the defendant after the settlement has been made 
(§ 257c (3) StPO). The moment at which it is possible to start negotiations is determined 
very broadly. For each stage of the procedure, the StPO explicitly envisages the possibility of 
discussing the state of the proceedings with the parties to the proceedings. Thus, before filing 
an indictment, the prosecutor may discuss the state of the proceedings with the participants 
in the proceedings (§ 160b StPO).60 The court may also initiate plea negotiations during the 
judicial review of the indictment (§ 202 StPO), and the law allows it to do so during the prepa-
53  Ivičević Karas, op. cit. note 2, p. 416.
54  See: Hettinger, M., Die Absprache im Strafverfahren als rechtsstaatliches Problem, JuristenZeitung, Vol. 66, No. 6, 2011, pp. 292-
301.
55  Rauxloh, R. E., Formalization of Plea Bargaining in Germany: Will the New Legislation Be Able to Square the Circle? Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, p. 321.
56  Mosbacher, A., The Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 19 March 2013 on Plea Agreements, German Law Journal, Vol. 15, 
No. 1, p.7
57  Weigend, Iontcheva Turner, op. cit. note 50, p. 85.
58  Ibid.
59  The term “in suitable cases” is very broad and vague, but it is suggested that the plea agreement should be taken into account in 
all cases in which it will significantly speed up the procedure. Murmann, U., Reform oder Wiederkehr? – Die gesetzliche Regelung der 
Absprachen im Strafverfahren, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, No. 10, 2009, p. 534.
60  The literature indicates that it is questionable whether the prosecutor and the defendant can create binding agreements without 
the involvement of the court. Rauxloh, op. cit. note 55.
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rations for the trial after the indictment has been confirmed (§ 212 StPO). Particularly signifi-
cant is § 257b StPO, allowing plea negotiations to be initiated even during the main hearing if 
the court deems it useful for the faster conclusion of the proceedings. However, regardless of 
whether the negotiations started before or during the trial, the law explicitly provides the ob-
ligation to adduce before a court at the hearing all negotiations conducted before or during the 
trial with the obligation to record the course, content and outcome of a negotiated agreement 
(§ 273 (1) StPO). If no agreement was negotiated, this will also be noted in the record (§ 273 
(1a) StPO). This ensures that the negotiation procedure as well as the concluded settlement 
are transparent and objectively verifiable through a potential appeal procedure.
The court is in principle bound by the negotiated agreement as well as by the initial pro-
posal of the sanction. However, the court will cease to be bound by a negotiated agreement if 
legally or factually relevant circumstances have been overlooked or have arisen and the court 
is therefore then convinced that the prospective sentencing range is no longer appropriate to 
the severity of the offence or the degree of guilt. The same applies if the defendant’s further 
conduct in the proceedings does not correspond to that on which the court’s prediction was 
based (§ 257 (4) StPO). In such circumstances, the court is obliged to inform the parties with-
out delay and the defendant’s confession may not be used in such cases (§ 257c (4) StPO).61 
Due to the legal consequences that arise for the defendant from this situation, the court is 
obliged to explicitly instruct the defendant about the conditions for and consequences of the 
court deviating from the prospective outcome of the negotiated agreement (§ 257 (5) StPO). 
The possibility for the court to withdraw from the agreement opens the door to legal uncer-
tainty. Here, the question arises as to how to justify the possibility for the court to suddenly 
disregard a confession that concurs with other evidence in the case file just because new ag-
gravating facts have emerged that go beyond the initial indication of a maximum sentence. In 
such a case, it implies that the agreement fails and the legal fiction is assumed that the court 
is no longer bound by the draft agreement, as well as that the defendant did not give a confes-
sion. However, a judge will find it difficult to maintain objectivity and impartiality if he or she 
has previously created the preconception of the defendant’s guilt on the basis of a confession 
and other evidence in the file. It is therefore questionable whether, in the further course of 
the proceedings, the judge can completely disregard the earlier confession given and ensure 
that the proceedings are conducted in a manner in which the presumption of innocence of the 
defendant is consistently respected.
The defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal cannot be a subject of the agreement. Thus, 
in § 302 (1) of the StPO it is expressly prescribed if a negotiated agreement has preceded the 
judgment, a waiver will be precluded. As an additional safeguard, § 35a (3) of the StPO explic-
itly provides for an additional instruction on the right to legal remedy (qualified instruction): 
“where a negotiated agreement has preceded a judgment, the person concerned shall also be informed 
that he is in any case free in his decision to seek an appellate remedy”. In this way, an attempt was 
made to prevent a waiver of the right to appeal from becoming a subject of agreement and 
thus to exclude the agreement between the parties from any control of the appellate court. 
However, insisting on the defendant’s right to appeal even in the case where the judgment is 
61  Some scholars criticise such a solution and point out that the preconditions for giving up from the legally binding function of the 
agreement are so vague that the defendant’s confidence in the effectiveness of the agreement and all his or her efforts can easily 
be betrayed. Beulke, W., Strafprozessrecht, C.F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, 2010, p. 253.
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based on a settlement has advantages and disadvantages. The positive side of the right to ap-
peal is reflected in the fact that the court must pay equal attention when writing the reasoning 
of the judgment based on the settlement, since the control of the legality and merits of the 
agreement before the appellate court is then ensured. The second question is how motivated 
the court will be to make a concession to the defendant and offer a settlement when it is aware 
of the possibility that a higher court may overturn this decision acting on the legal remedy, 
which has negative connotations for the judge’s career appraisals.62 Therefore, there is a real 
danger that the parties to the settlement will, behind closed doors, informally agree on the 
terms of the agreement in order to avoid disruption of the mutual trust-based working rela-
tionship which could potentially threaten future negotiations.63
2.2.5.  Absence of plea agreements in Austrian law
In Austria, there is no statutory regulation to explicitly forbid negotiations between the 
state prosecutor and the defendant, but there is no regulation to allow it, either. In other 
words, there is no mention of plea bargaining in Austrian statutory law. A distant relative of 
plea bargaining would be the so-called diversion (Rücktritt von der Verfolgung – Diversion, §§ 
198-209b Criminal Procedure Code), which is a unilateral offer by the state prosecutor who 
may decide to close proceedings conditionally if the offender is ready to pay a fine, do com-
munity service (gemeinnützige Leistungen) or agree on compensation with the victim (Tataus-
gleich). As the condition to proceed with diversion is willingness on the part of the defendant, 
the idea of diversion certainly does have something is common with plea bargaining, but it is 
still very distinct from classic plea bargaining, which involves the guilty plea of the defendant 
in return for some concession from the prosecutor. In the case of diversion, the defendant 
does not plead guilty when accepting diversion nor does the court deliver a judgment as a 
result of the diversion procedure.
The fact that Austrian statutory law does not allow or explicitly forbid negotiations between 
the state prosecutor (or the court) and the defendant has prompted the question whether in-
formal, “off the record” negotiations are permissible at all and whether the outcome of such 
negotiations (if they are to be considered permissible) is binding on the prosecutor and the 
court. This issue has been dealt with by the Supreme Court of Austria.64 In this case, a defence 
lawyer discussed the case with the judge who was the president of the competent court cham-
ber at the Higher Regional Court Graz. After the judge agreed to impose a relatively lenient 
sentence if the defendant pleads guilty, the lawyer advised his client to accept this informal 
offer. However, the court chamber did not uphold the “promise” of its president and imposed 
a harsher penalty in spite of the guilty plea. The Supreme Court dismissed the defendant’s 
appeal (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) while also using this case as an occasion to make some remarks 
about negotiations in general. The opinion of the highest Austrian court is unambiguous: it 
found negotiations between the defendant and the judge, except for those held in accordance 
with diversion proceedings, to be in “blatant contradiction” with the basic principles of the 
62  Ibid.
63  Ibid.
64  OGH 11 Os 77/4.
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Austrian law of criminal procedure, namely with the duty of the court to establish substantive 
truth (Erforschung der materiellen Wahreheit), which cannot be accomplished if the court “con-
tracts with the (alleged) offender”. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the parties of such 
negotiations could even be subject to disciplinary and criminal prosecution.
To conclude, Austria retains the traditional civil law approach to criminal justice, which 
considers the establishment of truth as the sine qua non of proper adjudication and sentencing. 
Therefore, the court is not perceived as an impartial referee, but as an active subject whose 
duty is to investigate the facts of the case in order to establish the truth and properly apply 
the law. This conception has been marginally eroded by the desire to make procedures more 
efficient, which has resulted in the creation of a few legislatively amended “shortcuts”, e.g. di-
version and the mandate procedure, where all such exceptions must be expressly prescribed by 
law. Informal negotiations would undermine this system and are therefore still frowned upon 
by the judiciary.65 Even though Austrian law, for the stated reasons, cannot be analysed here 
in this comparative research, it still provides valuable information on a system which operates 
without its own version of a plea-bargaining procedure. This is particularly relevant if we know 
that Croatian criminal procedural law has traditionally been influenced by the Austrian one.
3.  ANALYSIS of SPECIfIC ASPECTS of JUdGMENT bASEd oN 
AGrEEMENT of THE PArTIES IN CroATIAN LAW
3.1.   THE obJECTIvES of THIS CoNSENSUAL forM ANd THE SCoPE of 
CrIMINAL offENCES
Judgment based on agreement of the parties was introduced in Croatian legislation with 
the new Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) in 2008,66 primarily with the goal of providing an eco-
nomical and fast resolution of criminal cases.67  The corresponding consensual form that ex-
isted in the previous CPA of 199768 was reserved for less serious to more serious criminal 
offences, punishable with imprisonment of up to ten years. When enacting the new Criminal 
Procedure Act in 2008, the Croatian legislator drastically widened the scope of application of 
judgment based on agreement of the parties to all criminal offences,69 including the most seri-
ous ones and those under the jurisdiction of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and 
Organised Crime. Probably for that reason, the specific purpose of the traditional form of plea 
65  Jurisprudence is not unanimous on the matter: some authors are in favour of legislative amendments to enable plea bargaining 
(e.g. Ruhri, Verständigungen im Strafverfahren. Betrachtungen de lege ferenda Anwaltsblatt 2010, p. 243) while others are 
against (e.g. Böckemühl, Kier, Verständigungen in Strafverfahren – Ein Plädoyer gegen die Kodifizierung einer „StPO light“ in 
Österreich, Anwaltsblatt 2010, p. 402).
66  Criminal Procedure Act, Official Gazette 152/08, 76/09, 80/11, 121/11, 91/12, 143/12, 56/13, 145/13, 152/14, 70/17, 126/19, 
126/19.
67  See note 1.
68  Criminal Procedure Act, Official Gazette 110/97, 27/98, 58/99, 112/99, 58/02, 143/02, (62/03), 178/04, 115/06.
69  Ivičević Karas, E., Trial Waiver Systems in Croatia, Towards a Rights-based Approach to Trial Waiver Systems, LEAP, 2019, pp. 8 
– 9., accessible at: https://www.fairtrials.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/20190513_Trial_Waivers_Croatia_Final.pdf. 
Accessed 4 December 2020.
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bargaining was supplemented with another one – obtaining witness testimony against the 
defendant’s co-defendant, which testimony, once the defendant becomes a convicted person, 
would be given in another criminal procedure. Obtaining witness testimony is a typical mo-
tivation for consensual forms applied in organised crime cases, such as the crown witness or 
witness immunity.70 Although this specific purpose of bargaining is not explicitly prescribed 
by law, it is suggested in the “Instructions of the State Attorney General on proceedings dur-
ing bargaining”,71 and it is used in Croatian practice.72 The question now is whether the tradi-
tional model of plea bargaining may offer all the safeguards that are implemented in another 
consensual form which exists in Croatian law – the crown witness. Unlike the crown witness, 
whose status is granted by the court under strict conditions, including providing a complete 
and true statement and withdrawal of the status in the case of failure to do so, judgment based 
on agreement of the parties does not contain any such safeguards. This means that there is no 
guarantee that the defendant will testify truthfully once the court delivers a judgment based 
on agreement of the parties.
On the other hand, this comparative research has shown that, as far as concerns compara-
tive consensual forms corresponding to judgment based on agreement of the parties, the main 
objective of reaching an agreement is to achieve procedural efficiency, speed and economy. An 
additional purpose could also be the humanisation of proceedings for less serious criminal 
offences that should not necessarily entail holding a public trial.73 Accordingly, all compared 
European legislations that regulate their own specific forms of plea bargaining, with the ex-
ception of Germany (which may be excluded from the comparative perspective on this ques-
tion due to the very specific role of German courts in the accelerated procedure), provide this 
consensual form for less serious or more serious criminal offences, and explicitly or implicitly 
exclude criminal offences of organised crime and corruption, as well as other serious crimi-
nal offences. Accordingly, as these consensual forms are not used for more serious criminal 
offences, they do not serve for the specific purpose of obtaining witness testimony against 
future defendants who were formerly co-defendants, a purpose that is typical with regard to 
organised crime, as already pointed out. 
It can be concluded that the regulation of Croatian judgment based on agreement of the 
parties differs significantly from similar European consensual forms with respect to the gravi-
ty of the criminal offences concerned, and with respect to its very specific purpose – obtaining 
a witness testimony. This suggests that both the scope of criminal offences that may be subject 
to judgment based on agreement of the parties should be reconsidered, as well as the specific 
purpose of this consensual form in Croatian law. 
70  Ivičević Karas, op. cit. note 2, pp. 414 – 416.
71  Instructions of the State Attorney General on proceedings during bargaining with the suspect/defendant on terms of pleading 
guilty and the punishment state that the bargaining allows “the detection of other offences or other offenders”. Naputak o 
pregovaranju i sporazumijevanju s okrivljenikom o priznanju krivnje i sankciji, O-2/09, od 17. veljače 2010., p. 3, http://www.
dorh.hr/PresudaPoSporazumu. Accessed 10 December 2020. 
72  Ivičević Karas, op. cit. note 2, pp. 417 – 419; Ivičević Karas, op. cit note 69, p. 12. See an example in the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court, VSRH, II-4 Kr 61/2020-4 of 4 September 2020.
73  See Krapac, D., Presuda na zahtjev stranaka u stadiju istrage u hrvatskom kaznenom postupku, in: Decennium Moztanicense (ed. 
Pavišić, B.), Rijeka, 2008, p. 138.
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3.2. PoWErS of THE CoUrT 
The issue of judicial control over consensual procedures, and particularly over judgment 
based on agreement of the parties, has been one of the most disputed issues ever since this 
consensual form was introduced with the new CPA of 2008.74 The reason for this may lie in 
the fact that the new version of plea bargaining, judgment based on agreement of the parties, 
which replaced the old one, significantly reduced the powers of the court to control the parties’ 
agreement.75 At the same time, as stated above, the legislation expanded the scope of applica-
tion of this consensual form to the most serious criminal offences and therewith increased the 
stakes for all involved or interested in the outcome of bargaining: the prosecutor, the defend-
ant, the victim, but also the public. Therefore, the powers of the court to question the parties’ 
agreement are an issue of upmost importance.
In Croatian criminal procedure, judgment based on agreement of the parties may be deliv-
ered either before the indictment panel or at the preparatory hearing for the main trial before 
the president of the trial panel. Parties can only negotiate the terms of a guilty plea and an 
agreement on a sentence, and not the legal qualification of the offence (Art. 360(1) CPA). Even 
though any of the parties may initiate negotiations, which are conducted in camera, a written 
statement on the agreement, with specific content (Art. 360 (4) CPA) must be submitted to 
the court. Then the panel must first determine that the parties agree with the content of the 
submitted statement, and then decide on the indictment (Art. 361(1) CPA). If the indictment 
is confirmed, the panel will decide on accepting the statement (Art. 361(2) CPA). The panel 
may refuse to accept the statement for two reasons (Art. 361(3) CPA): firstly, if the acceptance 
of the statement is not in accordance with the sentencing prescribed by law, or, secondly, if the 
agreement is not otherwise lawful. Although this provision could provide relatively large pos-
sibilities for the court to control the statement, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Croatia gave a different interpretation.76 In one case, deciding on the request for 
the protection of legality, filed by the State Attorney General, the Supreme Court, in reference 
to Art. 361(3) CPA, stated that if the interpretation of the first instance court were accepted 
“that the cited legal expression allows the court to assess the agreed punishment in accordance with 
the provision of Art. 47 CC / 11 and that, depending on such assessment, does not accept or does 
accept the statement, and thus the agreed penalty, this would lead to inequality and arbitrariness 
in the proceedings of the first instance court both in the case when the statement is accepted and 
for that reason refused”.77 It added that “the court is not at all aware of the circumstances that the 
parties had in mind when agreeing on such a sentence, because the law does not oblige them to state 
them in the statement, and the court itself, given the stage of the proceedings (preparatory hearing), 
has no legal possibilities to determine those circumstances, and it is self-evident that circumstanc-
74  See Ivičević Karas, E., Puljić, D., Presuda na temelju sporazuma stranaka u hrvatskom kaznenom procesnom pravu i praksi Županijskog 
suda u Zagrebu, Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2013, pp. 841 – 842; Tomičić, Novokmet, op. cit. note 
1, pp. 182 – 184.; Turudić, Pavelin Borzić, Bujas, op. cit. note 1, pp. 143 – 147.; Ivičević Karas, op. cit. note 69, pp. 9 – 11.; Ivičević 
Karas, op. cit. note 2, pp. 423 – 424.
75  Judgment at the request of the parties in the investigation, regulated in the former CPA of 1997, actually allowed the 
investigating judge not to accept the parties’ request not only if there were no legal conditions for it, but also if the collected 
evidence (in the case file) did not justify the delivery of a consensual judgment. Krapac, op. cit. note 73, pp. 144.
76  Ivičević Karas, op. cit. note 69, p. 10.
77  VSRH, Kzz 38/16-3 of 27 September 2017.
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es which are not known cannot even be judged”.78 Deciding on the request, the Supreme Court 
quashed the final decision of the county court and remanded the case for a new decision. 
Yet, the county court made the same decision once again, so the Supreme Court, deciding on 
another request for the protection of legality, reversed the final decision of the county court, 
accepted the statement for rendering a judgment based on agreement of the parties and final-
ly rendered a judgment.79 The same reasoning was upheld in another case, when the Supreme 
Court, deciding on the request for the protection of legality, quashed the final decision of the 
county court and remanded the case for a new decision.80 In this manner, potentially great 
possibilities for the court to assess the adequacy of the parties’ agreement on the basis of the 
cited legal provision, especially with regard to the proposed punishment or other criminal law 
measure, have been reduced to a minimum.
Furthermore, if the court accepts the statement (on the agreement), the judgment may 
impose only the punishment or other measure as specified by the parties in the statement.81 
Imposing another punishment or criminal law measure would constitute a substantive viola-
tion of criminal procedure provisions which would lead to the quashing of the judgment and 
a retrial.82 It would be the same if the court deviated from the defendant’s statement on the 
claim for indemnification, which is an integral part of the agreement.83 Yet, the fact that the 
court may not intervene in the proposed sanction may actually be understood as an argument 
in favour of granting the court more powers to question the agreement from different aspects, 
and particularly regarding the punishment.
Finally, judicial control of the agreement is particularly important if we bear in mind that 
the possibilities to appeal the judgment based on agreement of the parties are rather limited. 
In the Croatian criminal procedure, parties may not challenge the judgment for an erroneous 
decision on a punishment or other criminal law measure, or for an erroneously or incomplete-
ly established factual situation, unless the defendant found out about the evidence of exclu-
sion of unlawfulness and guilt only after the judgment was delivered (Art. 364 CPA).
Looking from the comparative perspective, unlike Italian, French, Swiss and particularly 
German law, Croatian law provides for very limited possibilities for the court to reject the 
agreement of the parties. In German law, the court not only controls the agreement, but it 
is directly involved in negotiations and reaching an agreement between the parties. This, 
though, opens additional questions which will not be discussed here.84 On the other hand, in 
Italian, French and Swiss law, the court may reject the agreement not only for its unlawful-
ness, but also if the proposed punishment does not correspond to the purpose of the punish-
ment as proclaimed in the criminal code, and this is always in the case of less serious and more 
78  Ibid.
79  VSRH, Kzz 17/2018-5 of 8 and 9 May 2018.
80  VSRH, Kzz 2/2018-3 of 24 January 2018. In this case, however, the president of the panel gave a separate opinion in which he 
explained the reasons why he voted to reject the request for the protection of legality. 
81  See VSRH, I Kž 411/12-6 of 27 August 2013 and 11 March 2014.
82  In one case, the judgment based on agreement of the parties was not rendered on the initial statement on the agreement which 
was signed by the defendant, but on another statement which was signed only by the defence counsel and it contained a harsher 
punishment that the one the defendant actually agreed on with the state attorney.  VSRH, I Kž-Us 134/14-6 of 13 January 2015.
83  VSRH, I Kž-Us 60/12-4 of 10 October 2012.
84  See Tomičić, Novokmet, op. cit. note 1, p. 169 – 170.
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serious criminal offences. If we take one more look at the Croatian solution, it is clear that 
the legislative text would actually allow a similar interpretation. Yet, the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court, as we have seen, has not allowed it. Now, the solution in force, on one hand, 
provides agreements for the most serious criminal offences, while, on the other hand, the role 
of the court is dramatically reduced to the minimum. All the deficiencies that may appear in 
the agreed punishment, which are feared to be more obvious and radical the more serious the 
criminal offence in question is, now cannot be remedied through substantive and effective 
control of the court. It may therefore be concluded that the Croatian legislator should recon-
sider the role of the court in providing judicial control over this consensual form.
3.3. ProCEdUrAL ANd dEfENCE rIGHTS 
Issues concerning procedural and defence rights during plea bargaining are numerous, 
complex and difficult. Most of them concern consensual justice in general. This research has 
no pretentions to analyse all of them in detail. Instead, it will focus on several specific points. 
According to Croatian law, for the entire negotiation with the state attorney, the defendant 
must be assisted by a defence counsel (Art. 360 CPA). The defence counsel is one of the signa-
tories of the statement on the agreement submitted to the court. The defendant may initiate 
the negotiations with the state attorney, but the state attorney is not obliged to engage in 
the negotiations. Therefore, there is no obligation of the state attorney that would actually 
be complementary to the defendant’s right to agree on the punishment and other criminal 
law measures, a right which is actually proclaimed in Art. 64(1)11 CPA.85 Looking from the 
comparative legal perspective, the possibility to bargain on the punishment and to reach an 
agreement is a possibility, not a defence right. 
As concerns mandatory defence, this is explicitly prescribed in French and Swiss law. It 
may be justified by the fact that the defendant will not only plead guilty, but also waive a 
number of guarantees of a fair trial applicable to the full extent only at the trial stage. The 
defence counsel should compensate for this waiver at least to a certain extent. In addition, 
the defendant should be advised with regard to the negotiated punishment. In Croatian law, 
the role of the defence counsel is particularly important if we know that the court questions 
the agreement only to a very limited extent. Besides this role of procedural assistant to the 
defendant, the defence counsel has a broader role in guaranteeing that the negotiation and 
agreement process will be lawful. If the defence counsel has been present, the defendant’s 
subsequent allegations of unlawful conduct in the negotiations and agreement procedure will 
therefore be less credible.86
Another defence rights issue concerns situations where an agreement cannot be reached, 
or where it is not accepted by the court. If the parties withdraw the statement for a judgment 
to be delivered based on their agreement, the statement and all other data related to it must 
85  See Ivičević Karas, op. cit. note 2, pp. 426 – 427.
86  The Supreme Court in such cases always verifies whether the defence counsel was present throughout the bargaining process and 
before the court. See, for example, the judgment of the Supreme Court VSRH, I Kž-Us 103/2019-4 of 4 September 2019. See also 
decision VSRH, I Kž-Us 109/15-4 of  29 September 2015.
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be excluded from the case file and delivered to the investigating judge (Art. 362 (2) CPA). This 
includes the proposal for negotiation and all submissions related to that negotiation, so that 
the court at later stages of the process (at the trial and appeal) would not be “infected” with 
the content of the negotiations.87 The fact that the defendant was willing to negotiate, and 
that he or she actually engaged in those negotiations, should not be to the defendant’s detri-
ment. The same procedure should be applied if the court does not accept the statement on the 
reached agreement.
3.4. vICTIMS’ rIGHTS ANd PUbLIC INTErEST
Victims’ rights and public interest may be considered together, as will be explained. As 
concerns the victim, in Croatian law he or she is not included in the negotiations between the 
parties on the agreement. Only once the parties reach agreement does the state attorney in-
form the victim or the injured party (Art. 365(5) CPA). An exception is prescribed for criminal 
offences against life and limb and against sexual liberties, for which a punishment of more 
than five years’ imprisonment is prescribed by law, and for which the state attorney must ob-
tain the victim’s consent for the negotiation (Art. 360(6) CPA). If the victim is deceased or is 
incapable of consent, the state attorney should refer to a close relative of the victim. 
As concerns all victims, they are not included in the negotiation process, which takes place, 
as stated, in camera. Once the parties reach an agreement and it is brought to the court, the 
indictment panel decides on the indictment at a hearing which is closed to the public. The 
injured party or the victim is not summoned. 
From a comparative perspective, it can be noticed that victims have rather different legal 
positions in different legal systems. In French and Swiss law, victims have the right to partici-
pate in the procedure before the court and the procedure is public. In Switzerland, victims can 
even prevent the parties reaching an agreement. On the other hand, in Italian law, the hear-
ing in the patteggiamento procedure is closed to the victims, just as it is closed to the public. 
Hence, at least at first sight, the position of the victim in Croatian law might seem similar to 
the one in Italy. Yet, there are important differences. In Italian law, the parties may reach an 
agreement, patteggiamento, only for less serious and for some more serious offences. In addi-
tion, the court has the power to control not only the lawfulness of the agreement, but also the 
adequacy of the punishment proposed, so the lack of the victim’s contribution, as well as the 
absence of the public, may be compensated for at least to a certain extent through the role of 
the court. On the other hand, the absence of victims and the absence of the public when the 
court delivers a judgment based on agreement of the parties in Croatian law is combined with 
the very limited power of the court to question the agreement, and all the more so in cases 
which may concern even the most serious criminal offences. 
To conclude, opening a judgment based on agreement of the parties to the public, and al-
lowing the victim at least to be heard, should be among the first steps in any future legislative 
initiative in this field. As has already been stated, returning power to the court to question 
87  VSRH, I Kž 545/2019-4 of 30 October 2019.
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agreements and limiting the scope of this consensual form should certainly be considered 
within the same initiative. 
4. CoNCLUSIoN
This comparative legal study has shown that the regulation of Croatian judgments based 
on agreement of the parties differs significantly from similar European consensual forms in 
many aspects. One of them concerns the gravity of the criminal offences that may be subject to 
bargaining, and another is the very specific purpose of this consensual form – obtaining wit-
ness testimony. In Croatian law, plea bargaining is allowed even for the most serious criminal 
offences, and for the purpose of obtaining witness testimony in another criminal procedure.
As concerns the role of the court in bringing a judgment based on agreement of the par-
ties, looking from the comparative point of view, it should be concluded that Croatian law 
provides for very limited possibilities for the court not to accept an agreement of the parties. 
The legislative text could, though, be interpreted in a manner that would allow the court to 
question the parties’ agreement not only for the reason of its unlawfulness, but also to ques-
tion whether the proposed punishment would correspond to the purpose of punishment. Yet, 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has not allowed this. This means that the legislative 
solution in force allows, on one hand, agreements for the most serious criminal offences while, 
on the other hand, the role of the court is dramatically reduced to the minimum. All the defi-
ciencies that may appear in the agreed punishment, which can be expected to be more obvious 
and radical the more serious the criminal offence in question is, cannot be remedied without 
substantive and effective control of the court. This suggests that the Croatian legislator, in 
its future initiatives, should enable the court to exercise complete judicial control over this 
consensual form.
As regards the defendant, his or her position is indeed reinforced through mandatory de-
fence. Yet, compared to other analysed legal systems, the role of the defence counsel is particu-
larly important in the Croatian version of plea bargaining if we bear in mind the limited power 
of the court to question the agreement and the alleged lack of power to intervene for reason 
of the inadequate punishment proposed, even in cases of the most serious criminal offences.
Finally, opening to the public a hearing where the court decides on the agreement of the 
parties and delivers a judgment based on that agreement, as well as allowing the victim to be 
at least heard, is among the first steps to be taken in any future legislative initiative in this 
field. The presence of victims, and particularly the presence of the public when the court ren-
ders a judgment of conviction, contributes to the transparency of criminal proceedings which 
should be the legislator’s priority in any democratic society founded on the rule of law.
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PrESUdA NA TEMELJU SPorAZUMA STrANAKA U HrvATSKoM 
PrAvU: KrITIČKA ANALIZA IZ PorEdbENoPrAvNE PErSPEKTIvE
Sažetak
U ovome se radu razmatra presuda na temelju sporazuma stranaka u hrvatskom pravu, odno-
sno pojedini aspekti ovog sporazumnog oblika koji su u nekim prethodno provedenim istraži-
vanjima istaknuti kao potencijalno problematični. Ti aspekti uključuju ciljeve postizanja spo-
razuma, težinu kaznenih djela koja su predmet sporazuma, ulogu suda, pravni položaj obra-
ne te pravni položaj žrtve. Navedeni aspekti analiziraju se prvenstveno iz poredbenopravne 
perspektive, budući da su hrvatska inačica sporazuma o priznanju krivnje (plea-bargaining) i 
pojedini specifični oblici ovog sporazuma usvojeni u nekim drugim europskim zemljama na-
dahnuti istim američkim modelom. Uz američko pravo, istraživanje obuhvaća talijansko, fran-
cusko, švicarsko, njemačko i austrijsko pravo. Cilj poredbenog istraživanja jest utvrditi ima li 
hrvatski model ovog konsenzualnog oblika neka specifična obilježja koja se možda razlikuju 
od europskih poredbenopravnih rješenja te uzrokuju li upravo ta specifična obilježja teorij-
ske i praktične probleme. Istraživanje je obuhvatilo i analizu prakse Vrhovnog suda Republike 
Hrvatske koja se prvenstveno odnosi na pitanje sudske kontrole sporazuma stranaka, a ta je 
problematika dosad izazvala najviše rasprave i u domaćoj literaturi, i u sudskoj praksi.
Ključne riječi:   presuda na temelju sporazuma stranaka, konsenzualna pravda, konsenzualni 
postupci, sporazum o priznanju krivnje, kazneni postupak, sudska kontrola
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